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In The
SUPREME COURT
Of The
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN RUSSELL,
his wife,
PlaintiffsRespondents,

Supreme Court
No. 18160

vs.
STERLING B. MARTELL d/b/a MARTELL
HOLDING COMPANY, et al, and
GRANT C. MILLS,
DefendantAppellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION AND BRIEF
FOR REHEARING

Appellant respectfully petitions this court for a
rehearing in this matter on the grounds set out in the points
which follow and in support thereof submits these facts.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A more complete statement of facts is found in
appellant's original brief but most of the facts important to
this petition are briefly given here.
A default judgment was entered against appellant,
Grant C. Mills (hereinafter "Mills") on July 29, 1981.

Mills

filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on December 4,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1981, and the motion was heard by the lower court on the morning
of December 10, 1981.

The respondent, David Russell

(hereinafter "Russell") filed an affidavit, at the end of the
day on December 9, 1981, in which he stated that Mills told him
that he (Mills) intended to take no action on the summons and
complaint. -Bec-aus-e the affidavit was filed just prior to the
hearing on the motion to set aside the default judgment, Mills
had no opportunity to deny or otherwise respond to Russell's
statement.

In fact, Mills did not even see Russell's affidavit

prior to the hearing on the motion to set aside the default
judgment.
Mills' statement to Russell that he intended to take
no action on the summons and complaint was made after Russell
told Mills that he (Russell) "wasn't after me but was just after
Sterling Martell and Martell Holding Corp."
Russell's attorney, Mr. Hardy, filed an affidavit,
also at the end of the day on December 9, 1981, in which he
stated he had informed Mills of the default judgment against
him.

Mills also did not see this affidavit until after the

hearing and did not have an opportunity to deny or respond to
that statement.

The fact is that Mills, in response to that

information from Mr. Hardy, contacted the clerk of the court on
two different occasions and was told by the clerk that no
judgment had been entered against him but that a judgment had
been entered against two other defendants.

-2-
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The lower court denied the motion to set aside the
default judgment without specification of the reasons therefor
and this appeal followed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON "UNDENIED STATEMENTS"
OF PLAINTIFFS SINCE MILLS HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND
TO OR DENY THOSE STATEMENTS.
This court's refusal to set aside the default of Mills
was based upon Mills' "undenied statements that he felt no legal
obligation to respond to the plaintiffs' claims [which] evince a
complete indifference by him and negate any diligence on his
part in pursuing the opportunity to defend."
Opinion, pages 2-3)

(Supreme Court

This statement by the court overlooks the

fact that Mills had no opportunity to deny those statements
because those statements were made in affidavits submitted by
plaintiffs at or just prior to the hearing on the motion to set
aside the default judgment.
The hearing on Mills' motion was heard on the morning
of December 10, 1981.

Plaitiffs' affidavits in opposition to

the motion were signed on December 9, 1981, and hand-delivered
to the office of Mills' attorney at the end of that day.

Rule

6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires opposing
affidavits to be served "not later than 1 day before the
hearing."

Rule 2.7(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District
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Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah (and its
predecessor rule) provides that "affidavits not filed within the
time required by any rule of civil procedure shall not be
received except on stipulation of the parties or for good cause
shown."

The purpose of these rules is obviously to allow a

certain minimal time for parties to review and respond to
affidavits.,

"Not later than 1 day" must be taken to mean

"l full day" or the purpose of the rule becomes meaningless.

Mills had no opportunity to respond to those affidavits and they
were received and ruled upon by the lower court in violation of
the rules.

The statements upon which this court relies in
refusing to set aside the default represent only half of the
story.

Mills' version of those conversations is set out in his

affidavit attached to this petition.

Mills was told by the

plaintiff, David Russell, that "he (Russell) wasn't after me
(Mills) but was just after Sterling Martell and Martell Holding
Corpo"

Under this circumstance it would be natural for Mills to

respond that he intended to take no action on the summons and
complaint.

His actual response was that "then I shouldn't have

to take any action, should I?"
not.

Russell agreed that he should

However, Russell obviously misrepresented his intent to

Mills because he did take a judgment against Mills.
Plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Hardy, stated in his
affidavit that he informed Mills by telephone that a default
judgment had been taken against him.

It was in response to this
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statement that Mills checked with the clerk's office and was
informed that no judgment had been taken against him but only
against Martell and Martell Holding Corp.

This was in

accordance with what Russell had told Mills he would do and,
therefore, confirmed to Mills that he had no reason for concern.
Had the clerk discovered the second judgment against Mills in
the file and reported that to him, he would have immediately
taken action to have it set aside.

As it was, Mills had the

assurance of Russell that he wasn't after him and the assurance
of the clerk that no judgment had been taken against him.
With this full view of the facts, it can hardly be
said that Mills showed a complete indifference to those facts.
Instead, he acted very naturally, relying on the statement of
Russell, who had been a long-time friend and associate.

We

must remember that he was a layman, unaware of the legal rules
of procedure, who was misled by the plaintiff and by the clerk
of the court.

POINT II
RULE 60(b)(7) WAS INTENDED TO COVER THESE FACTS.
OTHERWISE, THERE IS NO POSSIBLE RELIEF FOR A
DEFENDANT WHO IS THE VICTIM OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR MISCONDUCT AND HAS NO NOTICE THEREOF FOR
MORE THAN THREE MONTHS.
Rule 60(b) states that a motion under the rule should
be brought within three months after the judgment if the motion
is based on the first four subparagraphs but within a reasonable
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time after the judgment if based on the latter three
subparagraphs.

The three-month limitation on the first four

grounds is obviously based on the assumption that the party
against whom the judgment is entered has knowledge that a
judgment has been entered.

If he has such knowledge and fails

to take any action within three months, the rule assumes he has
no grounds to have the judgment set aside or that he has
knowingly waived such grounds.

However, if he has no such

knowledge within the three-month period, it is impossible for
him to take any action to obtain relief from the judgment
within that period and it cannot be said that he has knowingly
waived his rights.

Therefore, reason suggests that the three-

month limitation would not begin to run until the judgment
debtor has notice of the entry of the judgment or that the last
ground stated ("any other reason justifying relief") was
intended to cover such situations.

Otherwise, it would be

possible for a plaintiff to cause a judgment to be entered
against a defendant who does not answer because of fraud,
misrepresentation, misconduct, mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
excusable neglect or improper service (all grounds for relief
from the judgment if asserted within three months) and
intentionally fail to notify the defendant of the entry of the
judgment until three months had expired, thereby depriving the
defendant of his rights under the rule.

In this case Russell

misrepresented to Mills that he was not after him and then took
a judgment against him but took no action to enforce the
judgment, which was entered July 29, 1981, until November 24,

-6-
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1981, after the three months had expired.

Thus, unless the

three month period runs only from the time of notice to the
judgment debtor or unless Rule 60(b)(7), the "any other reason"
ground, covers this situation, Russell is rewarded for the very
"fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct" the rule is designed to
prevent.
Why did Russell wait for three months to expire
before taking action to enforce his judgment?

Why did Russell

move so slowly before the three months had expired and so
quickly afterwards?

The potential for abuse of that rule is

obvious and the court should set aside the default of Mills and
allow this case to be heard on its merits in order to prevent
any abuse of that rule.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING DIRECTION TO THE LOWER
COURT AS TO THE EXTENT OF THE HEARING REQUIRED ON
REMAND.
This court has directed the lower court to conduct
further proceedings in conformity with its opinion.

Directions

are given specifically to "ascertain the amount of damages to
which the plaintiffs were entitled" and the "amount of income
• •• received on the security" but, no direction is given
concerning preliminary issues as to whether plaintiffs are
entitled to any damages at all.

Unless evidence is produced on

each of the following issues, implicit in plaintiffs'
complaint, it cannot be determined that plaintiffs are entitled
to any damages at all:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(1)

Whether Mills was in fact a licensed securities
agent;

(2)

Whether the note constituted a security
requiring registration;

(3)

Whether there existed any exemption from such
registration, for example, as an isolated
transaction [§61-l-14(2)(a)] or as secured
indebtedness [§61-l-14(2)(e)];

(4)

Whether any-representations were made to
Russells by Mills;

(5)

Whether those representations were true or
false;

(6)

Whether Russells knew of the untruth of the
representations; and

(7)

Whether Mills knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care could have known, of the untruth
of the representationse

In order to consider that kind of evidence, the lower
court should conduct a full hearing and must allow Mills to
participate in and present his own evidence at that hearing.
The plaintiffs' complaint does not contain any allegations with
respect to items 3, 6 and 7, above, and, therefore, even if all
allegations of the complaint were taken to be true, plaintiffs
have not established a prima facie case.

CONCLUSION
Since the court's opinion is based upon an untrue
assumption that Mills had an opportunity to deny or respond to
the statements of plaintiffs and since the matter of the fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct of plaintiffs without notice of
a judgment to Mills and of the extent of the hearing required

-8-
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on remand were not considered by the court, a rehearing is
necessary to consider these issues.
Appellant requests that the court set aside his
default and allow a full hearing on the merits to be held.
Otherwise, the very fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct,
that Rule 60(b) was designed to prevent, will have been
condoned by the court.

Respectfully submitted,

BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

By\(~~

Ra p
• Marsh
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In The
SUPREME COURT
Of The
STATE OF UTAH
GI

•

DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN RUSSELL,
his wife,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
STERLING B. MARTELL d/b/a MARTELL
HOLDING COMPANY, et al, and
GRANT C. MILLS,
DefendantAppellant.

••

AFFIDAVIT

•0
0

•

Supreme Court
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake)

GRANT C. MILLS, being first duly sworn, on oath,
deposes and says as follows:
1. That I am one of the defendants and the appellant
in the above-entitled case.
2. That some time in July 1981 I had a conversation
with the plaintiff David Russell in which Russell said that he
wasn't after me but was just after Sterling Martell and Martell
Holding Corp.,
3. My response to him was "then I shouldn't have to
take any action, should I?" He agreed that I should not.
4. That in August of 1981 I was informed by David
Eccles Hardy that a judgment had been taken against me. I
responded that I did not feel legally obligated to the
plaintiffs.
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-25. However, in response to the statement by Mr. Hardy,
I contacted the clerk of the court and inquired if a judgment had
been entered against me. The clerk responded that no judgment had
been taken against me but that a judgment had been taken against
Sterling Martell and Martell Holding Corporation.
6. I did not understand the effect of a judgment and
did not know my responsibility with respect thereto but had sent
the summons and complaint to my attorney and assumed that
appropriate responses had been filed.
7. I attended the hearing on the motion to set aside
the default judgment on the morning of December 10, 1981, but
did not see the affidavits filed by plaintiff in opposition to
the motion until after the hearing was completed. I wanted to
say something during the hearing in response to claims the
plantiffs were making but was told that I could not.
DATED this 21st day of February, 1984.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of
February, 1984.

My commission expires:

'1/-µJ/7t,

Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah.
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